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Abstract 
An overview is given of the growing number of regional associations in 
which states have entered into voluntary arrangements to limit 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In particular, in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a number of northeastern states have 
joined to create a regional GHG cap and trade program, beginning with 
the utility industry. Analysis is made of the five key issues relating to 
these current and potential climate action associations: the extent of the 
total and individual state mitigation cost-savings across all sectors from 
potential emission permit trading coalitions; the size of permit markets 
associated with the various coalitions; the relative advantages of joining 
various coalitions for swing states such as Pennsylvania; the implications 
of the exercise of market power in the permit market; and the total and 
individual state/country cost-savings from extending the coalition 
beyond US borders. It is shown that overall efficiency gains from trading 
with a system of flexible state caps, with greater overall cost savings 
increasing with increasing geographic scope. 
 
I. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the U.S. Presidential decision not to join the 
Kyoto Protocol, action on climate change mitigation policy formulation 
has shifted to local, state, and regional governments, as well as the U.S. 
 * The authors are, respectively, Professor of Energy, Environmental, and Regional 
Economics, The Pennsylvania State University; Adjunct Professor and Senior Research 
Associate, Center for Integrated Regional Assessment, The Pennsylvania State 
University; Senior Fellow, Research Program, East-West Center.  The authors wish to 
thank Judi Greenwald and Billy Pizer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper and to Dan Wei for her research assistance.  The views expressed in this paper 
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Senate.  In 2001, the six New England Governors joined five Eastern 
Canadian Premiers (NEG/ECP) in the formulation of a voluntary climate 
change agreement to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the transborder 
region to 1990 levels by 2010 and ten percent below 1990 levels by 
2020, and to identify longer-term pathways to reductions by 2100.1  
Through this agreement, states and provinces are encouraged to take 
individual and collective action across all emitting sectors toward a 
regional goal.  More recently, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
New York, and five other northeastern states led a Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) to create a regional GHG emission cap and trade 
program for the electric power sector, with several other states acting as 
formal or informal observers.2  The states of California, Oregon, and 
Washington announced the formation of the West Coast Global 
Warming Initiative3 in 2003 to organize and motivate action in the 
region.  Other states and provinces of Canada and Mexico may in the 
future be invited to join this effort.4  In 2005, fifteen western states 
participating in the Western Regional Air Partnership (WRAP) began 
informal discussion of climate change issues, including technical 
information development.5 In 2006 the states of Arizona and New 
Mexico formed a Southwest Climate Change Initiative to enable 
cooperative actions between these and potentially other neighboring 
states in the future.6 In addition, Arizona recently entered a similar 
cooperative agreement with the State of Sonora, Mexico.7 
One scenario for multi-state climate change agreements would have 
the momentum of these and other cooperative actions, including trading 
blocs, extend to a nationwide arrangement.  However, regional 
characteristics and preferences might lead to a more fragmented, and 
hence potentially less economically efficient and less environmentally 
beneficial outcome.  On the other hand, by affiliating regionally, these 
states may be able to capture and motivate regional opportunities for near 
and mid-term climate actions of great similarity that otherwise would 
lag. The Northeast and Western States are clearly aware of the benefits 
of actions to mitigate against vulnerability to climate change, including 
 1. The NEB/ECP agreement requires five-year scientific updates to clarify long-
term targets and timetables.  While specific years have not been specified for compliance, 
some environmental groups haves suggested a default of 2050 as the third time period of 
the agreement. 
 2. Webcast Briefing: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) (March 18, 
2005). 
 3. West Coast Climate Initiative, http://www.ef.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
 4. In addition, all eighteen Western States recently agreed to a regional goal of 
30,000 megawatts of renewable power generation by 2015.  Western Governors Clean 
and Diversified Energy Initiative, http://www.westgov.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
 5. The Western Regional Air Partnership is a program of the Western Governor’s 
Association, www.westair.org.   
 6. Actions by the two states are likely to begin once each has completed a 
comprehensive state GHG plan, now underway.  See www.azclimatechange.us and 
www.nmclimatechange.us.  
 7. Actions between Arizona and Sonora are likely to begin following the 
completion of statewide climate plans in each, now underway. 
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potentially serious impacts on forests, agriculture, coastal systems, water 
resources, tourism, and economic infrastructure.  Proactive states may be 
seeking potential first mover competitive advantage for new programs 
and technologies for reward under future national law.  They also prefer 
that the federal government be clearly aware of their needs and 
opportunities under potential federal legislation in the future, and do not 
want their voices left behind. The northeastern and west coast states are 
generally not major hosts to fossil fuel extraction (unlike many states of 
the interior West or Midwest) and are relatively less dependent on fossil 
fuel electricity generating capacity than are other states (although they 
depend heavily on imports of fossil-based power supply).  Interestingly, 
while some of the northeastern states have been more open to 
production-based approaches to emissions reductions, as opposed to 
consumption-based approaches that would hold them responsible for 
energy imports, others in the northeast seek consumption-based 
approaches that are more likely to engender cooperation from high 
energy production states providing power to the region.  West Coast 
states have generally favored consumption-based approaches to 
emissions standards in the electric power sector for the same reason. 
Both northeastern and west coast states are typically low to moderate in 
forecasted emissions growth in comparison to higher growth regions,8 
and they have typically enacted more emissions control measures than 
average. 
Potentially, this contrasts with the situation in the South Central, 
Southwest, Intermountain, and North Central States.  These have tended 
to have higher economic and population growth rates, fewer or less 
stringent control measures, stronger energy lobbies, and have been more 
hesitant to join the existing climate action coalitions until recently.9  One 
reason that new states may have so far resisted entrance into emerging 
cap and trade programs of the Northeast and West Coast is that current 
policy proposals could position them as permit buyers rather than sellers 
under traditional cap and trade control programs, particularly under 
production-based vs. consumption-based controls.  Although 
involvement in a multi-state cap and trade system would lower their 
mitigation cost in contrast to voluntary unilateral action, individual South 
Central, Southwest, Intermountain, and North Central States might still 
be inclined to explore other policy designs (such as electricity load-based 
systems) and coalition configurations that enable them to be permit 
sellers or to be buyers at lower cost.  By entering coalitions of states with 
 8. Growth rates for coastal states of the northeast and west coast average about 33 
percent for the period 1990-2020.  For example, while Arizona has an estimated 
emissions growth rate of 147 percent in this same period and New Mexico’s rate is 
estimated at 64 percent. (data and discussion available at www.azclimatechange.us/ 
ewebeditpro/items/O40F7959.pdf). 
 9. Recently, governor-appointed climate change advisory groups charged with 
developing statewide GHG plans in Arizona and New Mexico have tentatively agreed to 
explore regional and or national cap and trade approaches in the future, along with 
numerous other mitigation policies in all sectors (see www.azclimatechange.us and 
www.nmclimatechange.us). 
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more consonant baselines and GHG mitigation cost curves, or with states 
willing to mutually recognize comparable levels of effort that are 
indexed off of growth baselines instead of fixed base year amounts, they 
surmise that they are likely to be better off.  They might also band 
together as a single permit purchasing entity, or as smaller regional 
clusters, to exercise monopsony power to lower the costs of permits.10 
Also, although traditional regional associations, based in great part 
on history and geography, so far are pursuing forward movement on 
climate mitigation, conditions unique to the benefits and costs of GHG 
mitigation may call forth new alliances among states.  In the modern 
world of rapid transportation and communication, and in the case of a 
“globally mixed” pollutant, future coalitions need not even be confined 
to contiguous states.  For example, Oregon has recently joined the RGGI 
discussions as a formal observer (in addition to exploring a statewide cap 
and trade program independently), and invitations have been extended to 
California, Washington, and North Carolina. 
Interestingly, exploration of regional climate action coalition 
possibilities has also extended far beyond U.S. borders.  The RGGI 
coalition is discussing whether its members should be allowed to buy 
permits from the European Union.  The West Coast States are examining 
various GHG reduction opportunities with Pacific Rim countries, 
Canada, and Mexico, including both Kyoto signatories and non-
signatories.  Although the Kyoto Protocol currently restricts signatories 
from buying permits from non-participants, this obstacle might be 
overcome through further negotiation.11  One incentive is that this may 
be a way of obtaining U.S. involvement in Kyoto or future UNFCCC 
commitment periods by working directly with willing state governments 
in lieu of the current, recalcitrant presidential administration.  At the 
same time, there may be a disincentive to some U.S. states who stand to 
be major permit sellers in a purely U.S. arrangement, but whose offer 
price might be undercut by other countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze several important issues 
relating to current climate action coalitions in the U.S., potential 
coalitions among the states, and the choices facing Pennsylvania.  These 
issues include: 
 10. Note that permit allocations may be assigned first to either state governments or 
individual emitters.  If assigned to states, a government agency may be the official 
trading entity on behalf of emitters within its jurisdiction, or the agency may just in turn 
distribute the permits directly to emitters.  Monopsony power might arise in either 
instance.  Even if permits are assigned directly or indirectly to emitters, states are the 
negotiating parties in RGGI, in part on behalf of the emitters within their borders.  States 
with a large number of permit buyers can wield additional influence on the baseline 
permit allocation to their constituents or with respect to the permit price.  All of these 
outcomes will be beneficial for the states likely to be large permit buyers and a departure 
from the competitive outcome.  Thus, the results below represent an approximation of 
some of the possibilities of executing market power of various types. 
 11. One embassy representative of a European nation reacted to the barriers of 
including individual or a group of U.S. states in the Kyoto agreement as “ninety percent 
political, and ten percent legal.” 
 5
 
1.  How large are total and individual state mitigation cost-savings 
across all sectors from potential emission permit trading coalitions? 
2.  What is the size of permit markets associated with the various 
coalitions? 
3.  What are the relative advantages of joining various coalitions for 
swing states such as Pennsylvania? 
4.  What are the implications of the exercise of market power in the 
permit market? 
5.  What are the total and individual state/country cost-savings from 
extending the coalitions beyond U.S. borders? 
We will use models of interregional and international permit trading 
developed by Rose and Stevens,12 Zhang,13 Loschel and Zhang,14 and 
Rose and Zhang.15  These models are based on finding 
equilibrium/optimum solutions to permit exchanges given a set of GHG 
emissions forecasts and mitigation cost functions for each trading entity 
and overall emission caps, as well as various institutional constraints.  
The results should prove useful to climate policy-makers, business 
leaders, and environmental groups in their decisions about whether and 
how to participate in voluntary climate action planning arrangements. 
II. Background 
In 2001, Governor Pataki launched a comprehensive state climate 
change mitigation planning process following the decision of the 
incoming Bush administration to withdraw from negotiation on the 
Kyoto Protocol.  Prior to that time many states had formulated GHG 
plans without high-level political involvement, public input, or intensive 
cost-benefit analysis. Since that time several other states have followed 
suit, including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Puget Sound 
(Washington). The governor of Montana recently announced formation 
of a statewide planning process to establish a state GHG plan as well. 
New Jersey had developed a partial plan prior to 2000 and began updates 
toward a comprehensive approach.  Wisconsin and Oregon had also 
 12. Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens, An Economic Analysis of Flexible Permit Trading 
in the Kyoto Protocol, 1 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 219 (2001). 
 13. ZhongXiang Zhang, The Design and Implementation of an International 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme, 18 ENV’T & PLAN.: GOV’T & POL’Y 321 
(2000). 
 14. Andreas Loeschel & ZhongXiang Zhang, The Economic and Environmental 
Implications of the U.S. Repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Subsequent Deals in 
Bonn and Marrakech, 138 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 711 (2002). 
 15. Adam Rose & ZhongXiang Zhang, Interregional Burden-Sharing of Greenhouse 
Gas Mitigation in the United States, 9 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR 
GLOBAL CHANGE 477 (2004). 
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developed plans with partial implementation.  In addition to the 
NEG/ECP, RGGI and West Coast Global Warming Initiatives, other 
regional efforts indirectly related to GHG mitigation have been formed.  
These include:  the Clean and Diversified Energy initiative of 18 western 
states to expand energy efficiency and renewable energy use; the 
Western Renewable Energy Generation System (WREGIS) to track 
renewable energy used to meet renewable energy portfolios in 11 
western states; and the Powering the Plains initiative of five northern 
great plains states and the Province of Manitoba to expand alternative 
energy supply sources and technologies and track their implementation.  
The U.S. Senate has voted twice on pending legislation to establish a 
national greenhouse gas mitigation policy through the Global Climate 
Security Act of 2003, sponsored by Senators McCain and Lieberman.  
This bill is expected to be the basis of long term national policy 
formulation in Congress, together with new actions by state 
governments. 
In addition to comprehensive planning efforts, U.S. states have 
developed and/or enacted a remarkable variety of individual climate 
policy actions, often through reform of energy policy, transportation 
policy, resource management, land use, or air quality programs.  
Together they constitute a portfolio of over 200 specific actions across 
all sectors and include:  renewable portfolio standards, system benefit 
funds, appliance standards, building codes, smart growth programs, state 
procurement programs, power plant offset requirements, forest and farm 
conservation programs, waste to energy programs, and other measures.  
Implementation mechanisms include a variety of voluntary and 
mandatory approaches, including market based cap and trade programs.16 
New York was the first state in the recent era to seriously consider 
state-based cap and trade programs.17  As a result of state and regional 
modeling of these potential programs,18 the state government and a broad 
array of stakeholders concluded that a regional approach was preferable 
to a unilateral state approach due to potential competitiveness impacts 
and displacement (also known as “leakage”) of emissions from imported 
power, in addition to the likely efficiency gains from including more 
low-cost sources.  In 2003, the state of Connecticut launched the 
Connecticut Climate Change Stakeholder Dialog (CCCSD) to provide 
recommendations to Governor Rowland to meet or exceed targets of the 
 16. For a discussion of examples of these actions, see Thomas D. Peterson, The 
Evolution of State Climate Change Policy in the United States: Lessons Learned and New 
Directions, 14 WIDENER L.J. 81 (2004).  For a summary of nearly 200 local government 
initiatives, see Carolyn Kousky & Stephen H. Schneider, Global Climate Policy: Will 
Cities Lead the Way? 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 359 (2003). 
 17. NYSERDA launched the New York Greenhouse Gas Task Force for Governor 
Pataki in 2001 and formed a stakeholder process that delivered recommendations to the 
Governor in 2003. 
 18. ICF Consulting’s Integrated Planning Model (IPM) of the electricity sector was 
deployed to examine several cap and trade scenarios in New York and the surrounding 
region.  Results suggested significant potential for electric power imports in response to 
constraints on New York power generators. 
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NEG/ECP.  During the course of intensive deliberations by this group, 
new modeling was conducted of potential state and regional cap and 
trade scenarios for the power generation and consumption sector.19  
Results again suggested major displacement of in-state emissions 
reductions from power exports, and led stakeholders to recommend 
(unanimously) that the state pursue cap and trade policies at the broadest 
geographic level possible, and to explore alternate mechanisms to 
address power imports.  In particular, generation performance standards 
and consumption-based standards were recommended for further review.  
During this same period New Jersey began to explore the prospects of a 
regional renewable portfolio standard among Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
and Maryland, which are connected by the PJM Independent System 
Operator. 
As a consequence of the modeling results and stakeholder inputs of 
these and other state planning processes, several states expressed interest 
in regional discussion of a cap and trade program.  New York Governor 
Pataki invited ten other states to join in regional discussions, and, when 
eight accepted, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was 
born.  This interstate dialog set a goal of developing program 
recommendations and policy design by April 2005, including stakeholder 
input and a variety of technical analysis and modeling.  Preliminary 
results of this modeling have recently become available and provide 
similar results to earlier modeling done in New York and Connecticut.  
The configuration of states (the definition of “region”) and level of effort 
expected of each state are key variables in this process.  The role that 
Pennsylvania plays is critical.  Earlier modeling from the Connecticut 
dialog suggested a substantial level of low-cost, high-emissions coal-
based power export from Pennsylvania and the Eastern Interconnect 
under a production-based Northeastern cap that did not include 
generators outside the region.20 
One key result of modeling in the Northeastern States was a 
definition of forecasted “baselines” of emissions through 2020.  
Significant differences exist between states that affect mitigation costs, 
levels of effort against common targets, and credit market positioning.  
For instance, modeling in New York predicted a 17 percent reduction in 
carbon emissions below 1990 baseline levels by 2020, whereas modeling 
in Connecticut predicted a slight increase over the same period.  These 
differences are due to multiple factors, including the treatment of imports 
and exports of energy, and have a crucial impact on multi-state target 
negotiations where equity is concerned.21  Future modeling efforts must 
explore alternate baseline setting methods (such as baseline growth), 
 19. IPM was used to develop a reference case for the state and region and evaluation 
of six cap and trade scenarios. 
 20. Webcast Briefing: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) (March 18, 
2005). 
 21. See, e.g., Adam Rose & ZhongXiang Zhang, Interregional Burden-Sharing of 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in the United States, 9 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION 
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 477 (2004). 
state configurations, control strategies, and a broader set of trading 
sectors than the current exclusive focus on electricity generation, if 
displacement effects are to be minimized, rules are to be fairly 
negotiated, and emission purchase/sale patterns are to be clearly 
understood. 
III. The Model 
 Our model is based on well-established principles of the ability of 
unrestricted permit trading to achieve a cost-effective allocation of 
resources in the presence of externalities.22  In the context of the RGGI, 
where a strict cap implies unique GHG emission reduction requirements, 
the individual state and overall regional optimization can be 
accomplished without explicit consideration of the benefits side of the 
ledger (i.e., it yields “efficiency without optimality”).  It simply requires 
equalization of marginal costs of all entities with the equilibrium permit 
price.23  This ensures minimization of total net compliance costs for each 
region and minimization of total abatement costs for the nation as a 
whole.24  For purchasing states, compliance costs are equal to own 
abatement cost plus the cost of permits, whereas for selling regions, 
compliance costs are equal to own abatement cost minus the revenues 
from selling permits.25  States with marginal mitigation costs above the 
permit price will buy permits, while states with marginal mitigation costs 
below the permit price will sell permits.  Both will be better off as a 
result, with purchasing states reducing their net costs of mitigation and 
selling states reaping a profit from the sale of permits.  For the region as 
a whole, permit sales and purchases balance.  
 8
 
 22. See, e.g., THOMAS H. TIETENBERG, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, EMISSIONS 
TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985). Emission permit 
trading, or the “property rights” approach to environmental remediation stems from the 
Coase Theorem, which provides the rationale for permit trading: that externalities (such 
as pollution) can be efficiently eliminated (or a target reduction achieved) if enforceable 
property rights (emissions permits) can be assigned, regardless of the initial distribution 
of property rights or the final distribution of outcomes. 
 23. See ZhongXiang Zhang, The Design and Implementation of an International 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme, 18 ENV’T & PLAN.: GOV’T & POL’Y 321 
(2000); Andreas Loeschel & ZhongXiang Zhang, The Economic and Environmental 
Implications of the U.S. Repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Subsequent Deals in 
Bonn and Marrakech, 138 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 711 (2002); Adam Rose & 
ZhongXiang Zhang, Interregional Burden-Sharing of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in the 
United States, 9 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 477 
(2004). 
 24. For a generalized optimization approach to the problem, see also Brandt Stevens 
& Adam Rose, A Dynamic Analysis of the Marketable Permits Approach to Global 
Warming Policy: A Comparison of Spatial and Temporal Flexibility, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. 
& MGMT. 45 (2002). 
 25. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS (1994).  The shape of 
the cost function for mitigating carbon emissions has been studied extensively.  For 
example, Nordhaus found that the logarithmic functional form provided the best fit for 
the estimates of the marginal costs of mitigating a specific amount of carbon emissions 
among a number of economic modeling studies that he surveyed (a type of meta-
analysis).  Id.  Nordhaus used an analytical model to further derive a logarithmic 
relationship between the marginal costs and the percentage reduction.  Id. The cost 
function used in our study is thus MCAi  = − ln 1− Ri( ) α i ,  i = 1 ,  . . . , n. 
 The formal model consists of a set of marginal cost curves, one for 
each state, sets of constraints relating to initial permit allocations for 
individual states and total emission permit levels, and permit demand and 
supply balances.  The objective function is to minimize the net cost of 
GHG mitigation across all states in a given permit trading coalition.  The 
model is modified with respect to the assumption of “price-taking” 
behavior for conditions of market power on the buyer’s side (monopoly) 
or seller’s side (monopsony).  The model is solved with the use of the 
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS).26 
IV. Basic Results 
Our simulations were performed with the model summarized in the 
previous section calibrated to the abatement cost functions for each state 
in the existing or potentially expanded RGGI trading bloc and various 
other potential coalitions in the U.S.  The model incorporated the original 
state GHG caps equal to the NEG/ECP levels:  GHG levels in 2010 equal 
to 1990 levels, and GHG levels in 2020 equal to ten percent below 1990 
levels.  During the course of recent negotiations, however, these targets 
were substantially reduced to minimize potential displacement and cost 
impacts.27  In addition, the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island 
dropped out of the agreement prior to its conclusion.  We simulate some 
but not all of these changes as well.  The model could readily be adjusted 
further with new state configurations, state targets, cost curves and 
emissions forecasts, as well as the use of a consumption based vs. 
production-based system. 
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The empirical base of the model is an extension of that developed 
by Rose and Stevens.28  The major refinement in this present study was 
to specify mitigation cost functions for each of the states and the 
European Union.  This was done for the states by adjusting the U.S. 
mitigation cost function in the Rose-Stevens model by parametric shifts 
for the states in direct proportion to their energy intensity weighted by 
the relative carbon content of the three major fossil fuels.29  Thus, for 
 26. ANTHONY BROOKE, DAVID KENDRICK, & ALEXANDER MEERAUS, GAMS: A 
USER’S GUIDE (Scientific Press 1996) (1992). 
 27. The final draft model rule for RGGI establishes the following GHG reduction 
target: “RGGI will stabilize emissions from the power sector at approximately current 
levels from the start of the program in 2009 through the beginning of 2015.  From 2015 
through 2018 emissions will decline, achieving a 10% reduction in 2018.  In addition, 
some of the program reductions will be achieved outside the electricity sector through 
emissions offset projects.”  Text of the draft rule is available at 
www.rggi.org/modelrule.htm.  
 28. See Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens, The Efficiency and Equity of Marketable 
Permits for CO2 Emissions, 15 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 117 (1993); Adam Rose & 
Brandt Stevens, A Dynamic Analysis of the Marketable Permits Approach to Global 
Warming Policy: A Comparison of Spatial and Temporal Flexibility, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. 
& MGMT. 45 (2002). 
 29. The shift is accomplished by altering the α i  parameter value (see, e.g., equation 
1).  The basic α i  value is 0.00357 for the U.S. as a whole based on a synthesis of values 
in the literature, including a provision for technological change.  Given the functional 
form, energy intensity and the parameter value have an inverse relationship.  Thus, a state 
with an emission weighted fossil energy intensity half as large as the U.S. average would 
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example, higher cost states are Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and 
Maine, with relatively lower cost states being Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and New York.  This is an admittedly crude basis for 
mitigation cost specifications, and hence the results presented here 
should be taken only as generally illustrative of the issues at hand.30 
Alternate cost curves could be substituted in the model based on 
empirical results, expert judgment, or sensitivity analysis. 
The results from preliminary simulations of a carbon cap and trade 
system under various geographic configurations are presented in Tables 
1 through 3.  All pertain to permit trading in various combinations of 
states in the Northeast U.S., including one simulation that adds the 
European Union to the mix, to achieve targets set forth by RGGI—
carbon dioxide emission reductions to Year 1990 levels in each state by 
the Year 2010.  Note that the analysis includes all potential carbon 
emitters and not just the electricity sector.  Although the configuration of 
RGGI is currently limited to the latter, designers of the system, as well as 
policy-makers in other regions, gave serious consideration to expanding 
it to include other emitters and expect that future implementation phases 
would do so.31  The analysis here then represents the ultimate extension 
have an α i  parameter value twice as large (0.00714).  These relative weighted fossil fuel 
intensity values are proportional to the ratios of CO2 emissions and GSP in Appendix A.  
The α i  parameter for the European Union is 0.00314, which is steeper than the U.S. 
average.  Note also that, although the marginal cost curve has a logarithmic term, because α i  is in the denominator the overall function is essentially an exponential one, which 
exhibits the desired diminishing returns feature. 
 30. Note that our analysis has other limitations on the cost side and omits the 
benefits side completely.  First, our cost functions are based on a synthesis of the 
professional literature and include primarily GHG mitigation strategies such as 
conservation, interfuel substitution, and other fuel and input substitution.  This omits, for 
example, the alternative of reducing carbon in the atmosphere by various means of 
carbon sequestration, such as tree planting.  Rose and Oladosu have shown that 
incorporating sequestration can greatly reduce the total cost of reducing CO2.  Adam 
Rose & Gbadebo Oladosu, Greenhouse Gas Reduction in the U.S.: Identifying Winners 
and Losers in an Expanded Permit Trading System, 23 ENERGY J. 1 (2002).  
Unfortunately, data are inadequate to specify regional distinctions in sequestration costs 
at this time.  Likely regional differences in these costs could significantly affect the 
results presented here, though not in the near term, such as the Kyoto compliance period 
(2008-12), since it takes some time (to allow for tree growth) for this option to take hold.  
(The term, “mitigation,” is sometimes used to cover the broader set of tactics, including 
sequestration, while abatement is sometimes used to cover the more narrow set.  We use 
the terms as synonyms with the clear understanding that we have not included carbon 
sequestration.)  We have omitted the benefits of GHG mitigation as well, which are also 
likely to have significant differential impacts across regions.  See, e.g., Barry D. Solomon 
& Russell Lee, Emissions Trading Systems and Environmental Justice, 42 ENV’T. 32 
(2000).  Benefit estimates are especially tenuous, and we have sought to illustrate major 
issues and the usefulness of our methodology with as strong a data underpinning as 
possible.  The reader is referred to Rose and Stevens for insight into the difference that 
the inclusion of benefits makes in permit trading systems in the international domain.  
See Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens, An Economic Analysis of Flexible Permit Trading in 
the Kyoto Protocol, 1 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 219 (2001); Brandt 
Stevens & Adam Rose, A Dynamic Analysis of the Marketable Permits Approach to 
Global Warming Policy: A Comparison of Spatial and Temporal Flexibility, 44 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 45 (2002).  Of course, actual policy design must include some 
assessment of benefits. 
 31. Webcast Briefing: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) (March 18, 
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of this proposal.  Of course, the implications of broader coverage are 
sensitive to various aspects of policy instrument design (e.g., upstream 
vs. downstream allocation of permits).  However, we abstract from these 
subtleties at this point.32 
The simulations are based on data presented in Appendix Table A 
for RGGI states, as well as analogous data for other U.S. regions and the 
European Union.  The results, in terms of emission projections and 
mitigation cost levels are sensitive to the data sources and assumptions 
used, over which there is some variation in the literature, especially with 
regard to future emissions projections.  However, the focus of the 
analysis here is on relative impacts across states, a condition that is less 
sensitive to precise projections or cost curves.33 
The simulations to follow are ordered in an ascending manner in 
terms of geographic units included in the trading program.  Simulations 
actually begin with an analysis of the outcome of confining trading to the 
original six New England states, then progresses to the current 
configuration of RGGI plus one observer state (Maryland), and then to 
the inclusion of Pennsylvania and the European Union.  Although each 
progressive expansion of RGGI increases the gains from trade and 
lowers the per-unit cost of achieving the given emission reduction, some 
2005). 
 32. The main avenue for expansion beyond the current emissions and remediation 
scope of RGGI is “offsets.”  This refers to reductions in emissions outside the program 
that can count as reductions to emitters within it.  Offsets can be viewed as partial 
trading, i.e., emitters can purchase or sponsor offsets but not sell them.  At present serious 
consideration is being given to expanding beyond just the electricity sector to include 
natural gas efficiency, expanding beyond carbon dioxide to include landfill gas and SF6 
from electricity transmission, and expanding beyond current RGGI borders through 
participation in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and including the European 
Union (EU).  Future offsets include such GHGs as HFC-23 and coal mine methane (if 
Pennsylvania participates), as well as additional mitigation strategies such as soil 
sequestration.  In addition, the geographic expansion has been referred to as “any location 
in the U.S. with an adequate carbon constraint.”  Id. Various studies have shown that 
making permit trading as comprehensive and flexible as possible can significantly lower 
mitigation costs (e.g., by as much as 75 percent over non-tradeable quotas on a single 
GHG).  Of course, there are extensive design and implementation issues that must be 
addressed, e.g., the “trading ratio” between the various GHGs.  Also, to be considered is 
the cost of managing and enforcing such broad agreements.  Considerable economies of 
scale and scope do exists, but the best approach may be a sequential evolutionary one that 
capitalizes on successful experience, while maintaining partner cohesion and 
opportunities to fully engage the stakeholder process.  See, e.g., Nathan Collamer & 
Adam Z. Rose, The Changing Role of Transaction Costs in the Evolution of Joint 
Implementation, 9 INT’L ENVTL. AFFAIRS 274 (1997). 
Other ways of expanding a trading program refer to its time horizon.  Currently the 
plan is for a three-year compliance period in RGGI, so there is some implicit banking and 
borrowing of permits.  Otherwise, banking over longer periods is allowed and early credit 
action is as well.  These considerations add some flexibility in timing mitigation, though 
this opportunity has not been found to yield cost-savings anywhere near as large as those 
noted in the previous paragraph. Brandt Stevens & Adam Rose, A Dynamic Analysis of 
the Marketable Permits Approach to Global Warming Policy: A Comparison of Spatial 
and Temporal Flexibility, 44 J. ENVTL.  ECON. &  MGMT. 45 (2002).  Moreover, it may 
make enforcement more difficult. 
 33. The emissions projections in this paper are near the upper bound of the range of 
projections by several other sources. 
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expansions yielded only very light improvements.  On the other hand, 
while overall changes may be minor, the distribution of gains among 
individual states and the European Union vary much more significantly.  
This is primarily because each configuration is achieved at a different 
equilibrium permit price, and the individual pattern of trading is very 
sensitive to this variable. 
A. New England States Only 
The first set of simulations is for the New England States alone 
(Table 1), whose gross emissions in 2010 are projected to be 62 million 
tons of carbon (tC) and whose cap, equivalent to 1990 emission levels, is 
45.2 million tC (see Appendix Table A).  In this case, total mitigation 
costs in the absence of trading are estimated to be $2.072 billion, and 
permit trading lowers this amount by only a modest 4 percent to $1.988 
billion.  The permit market is rather thin given the narrow distribution of 
mitigation cost curves for these six states (i.e., the marginal cost of 
carbon mitigation does not vary much). 
Given their relatively high mitigation cost curves, ME and NH are 
permit buyers and CT and RI sell a significant number of permits, while 
MA and especially VT sell very few.  The equilibrium permit price is 
$68.02 per ton carbon, and the marginal mitigation costs for the latter 
two states are very close to this level ($67.89 for MA and $67.96 for 
VT), thereby significantly limiting their gains from trade. 
Net cost comparisons before and after trading indicate the biggest 
winner is ME in both absolute and relative terms.  The bottom line, 
however, is that all states are better off after trading, though only 
marginally so for some states, and even states that are relatively large 
buyers of permits have as much or more to gain, in both absolute and 
relative terms, than do permit sellers. 
B. RGGI States Plus Maryland. 
 The second set of simulations is for the nine original RGGI States 
plus Maryland, and will serve as a reference point for the subsequent 
simulations.34  This configuration has projected emissions of 213 million 
tC, or more than triple that of the New England states alone, with NY 
being the largest emitter by far.  At the same time, the four additional 
states have mitigation cost curves within the range of those of the 
original New England states, with NY having the lowest curve, but still 
higher than those of RI and CT (see Appendix Table A). 
As shown in Table 2, total mitigation costs for the ten states before 
trading are $7.125 billion, and this total declines to $6.916 billion after 
trading, or only a 3 percent improvement.  The minor overall gains from 
trade are due to the fact that the weighted average of the four additional 
states’ mitigation cost curves are only slightly below the New England 
 34. At the time of this writing, a bill, with considerable support, is before the 
Maryland Legislature requiring that this state join the RGGI coalition.  
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states weighted average.  This is also reflected in the equilibrium permit 
price for Case B of $69.13 per ton carbon, which is only 1.6 percent 
different, though higher, than in Case A. 
Of course, the size of the permit market expands considerably, and 
all of the New England states engage in more permit trading than in Case 
A.  However, in terms of net costs, only one of the New England states 
(Connecticut) receives an improvement, and then it is only slightly more 
than 1 percent, in Case B over net costs in Case A.  All four of the 
additional states that make up the expanded RGGI area are better off as a 
result of joining the trading program (compare the “Before Trading 
Mitigation Cost” column and the “After Trading Net Cost” column of 
Table 2) but only slightly.  MD reaps the greatest absolute gain ($51 
billion) and DE the largest relative gain (12 percent).  NY is the only one 
of the four additional states to be a permit seller, and at a level more than 
three times as high as the next highest selling state (CT).  MD becomes 
the largest permit buyer by nearly twice as much as the next highest 
buying state (ME). 
C. RGGI Plus Pennsylvania 
The third simulation adds Pennsylvania to the RGGI plus Maryland 
configuration.  This new entrant’s carbon emissions are more than three 
times as high as MA and nearly twice as high as the entire New England 
region.  Moreover, PA’s marginal mitigation cost of $153.06 is more 
than twice as high as all of the New England States except ME.  Total 
carbon dioxide emissions projections for the entire group are now about 
309 million tC, about 45 percent higher than the overall total in Case B 
(see again Appendix Table A).  Pennsylvania has a marginal mitigation 
cost curve significantly higher than the marginal cost curves of all the 
RGGI states (see Appendix Table A), thereby resulting in a new permit 
market equilibrium at $84.77, significantly higher than the prior 
simulation. 
As shown in Table 3, total mitigation costs before trading are 
estimated to be $14.1 billion, but this time the overall cost savings is 
much higher than in Simulation 2 at 12.9 percent.  Again all states are 
better off as a result of trading, with PA achieving the largest absolute 
gain ($1.3 billion) and RI again achieving the largest relative gain (23.5 
percent).  PA is the largest permit buyer (38.9 million tC), and NY is still 
the largest permit seller (23.7 million tC). 
Compared to Case B, and owing to the higher permit price in Case 
C, all permit selling states are better off and all permit buying states are 
worse off.  The biggest gainer from the inclusion of PA is CT in absolute 
terms and RI in relative terms.  The biggest losers are MD in absolute 
terms and ME in relative terms.  All New England states are better off 
than in Case A except ME. 
Clearly, by the nature of the size of its emissions and relatively high 
cost of mitigation, PA dominates the market (91 percent of the permit 
purchases).  Although it has much to gain from joining RGGI in 
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comparison to a “go it alone” strategy (gains from trade of $1.3 billion), 
PA residents may be slow to appreciate the outflow of more than $3.3 
billion annually for emission permit purchases.  Also, given its 
dominance in the market on the buyer’s side, PA could exercise its 
monopsony power (the ability of a large buyer to influence the permit 
price to its own advantage) to significantly lower the permit price, 
thereby reducing its permit expenditures, as well as the potential revenue 
of permit sellers.  The detailed effects of this strategy will be explored 
next. 
D. Expanded RGGI with Pennsylvania Exercising Monopsony Power 
The fourth simulation includes the same states as the third but 
allows Pennsylvania to exercise its market power in light of its 
domination of the market on the buyer’s side.  The overall results (not 
shown in a detailed table) are not drastically different than those of Table 
3. 
By exercising its monopsony power, Pennsylvania is able to lower 
the permit price, but only slightly, from $84.77 to $82.09.  This makes 
permit sales less attractive to sellers, and there is an overall reduction in 
permit transactions from a market of $3.649 billion to one of $3.079 
billion.  Pennsylvania purchases decrease by $635.9 million, but are 
offset a bit by permit purchase increases by MD, ME, and DE.35 
Total net costs for all states after trading are increased but only by 
$42.9 million, or 0.35 percent; this is a measure of the efficiency loss due 
to the imperfect competition in the market.  Despite the exercise of 
market power, PA’s gain is only $52.4 million or only a 0.93 percent 
improvement.  Thus, the net loss to all other states as a whole is $95 
million, or 1.4 percent of their net costs in Table 3.  All permit selling 
states are slightly worse off than under Scenario 3, and all permit buying 
states are slightly better off.  Of course, all states are better off than had 
trading not occurred, and all permit sellers are still better off than if 
Pennsylvania had not joined the agreement. 
E. RGGI plus MD Plus EU 
The fifth simulation (again not shown in detail) adds the European Union 
to an expanded RGGI configuration but omits PA.  Despite its much 
larger size in terms of its economy and carbon emissions, the EU is 
compatible with this arrangement.  Its mitigation cost curve is slightly 
higher than the U.S. average, but slightly lower than the weighted 
average of the RGGI states (it is lower than ME, MD, and DE, and much 
lower than PA).  Despite having projected CO2 emissions five times 
higher than the RGGI group, the EU buys only a modest amount of 
 35. Pennsylvania’s decision to buy fewer permits despite having forced their price 
down is consistent with behavior in a monopsony market.  As in a monopoly market, 
power is exercised by restricting the market size. 
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permits (35.7 million tC).36  Despite having more than ten times the 
emissions of PA, this means that EU purchases even fewer permits from 
RGGI than did PA in Case C.  The equilibrium permit price for this case 
is $83.39, or $1.38 less than Case C.  Despite all of this, however, the 
gains from trade to Europe are only about $95 million, or an 
improvement of only 0.3 percent.  Moreover, we have looked at a sub-set 
of all trading possibilities for Europe.  The EU is likely to find other 
attractive partners in a global trading scheme, and thus its involvement in 
RGGI would be even smaller, as would its gains from trade. 
Comparing this simulation with that of Table 2, all RGGI states, 
except permit buying states ME, DE, and MD, are better off with the 
entry of the EU.  Of these states, MD suffers the largest absolute loss $48 
million, while ME receives the largest percentage decrease (10 percent).  
All permit sellers are better off with the entry of the EU.  The larger 
absolute gain goes to NY ($220 million) and the largest percentage gain 
goes to CT (14 percent). 
F. RGGI Plus MD, PA and EU 
The sixth simulation adds both PA and the EU to the base case.  The 
equilibrium permit price is now $87.43, an increase from Case B of over 
$18, and a slight increase from Case E of slightly over $4.  Accordingly, 
in comparison to Case E, all permit selling states are projected to be a 
few percentage points better off in terms of net costs, while all the permit 
buying entities are projected to be worse off for a few percentage points.  
The EU is only 0.03 percent worse off. 
PA’s permit expenditures are $3.271 billion, compared with $3.308 
billion in Case C, but the EU’s permit purchases, due to a significantly 
higher permit price in this case, drop to $697 million in Case F from 
$2.978 billion in Case E.  In fact, given other permit opportunities, 
especially with low cost options in Eastern Europe, it is conceivable that 
extending an invitation to the EU would be a moot point if PA were also 
to be part of the trading arrangement. 
V. Recent Defections from RGGI 
 As noted earlier, Massachusetts and Rhode Island recently dropped 
out of the RGGI coalition, but Maryland is likely to join.  We therefore 
simulated the implications of this modified coalition, though with the 
original RGGI emission target levels.  These levels are assumed to be 
indicative of future RGGI target adjustments. 
 The results (not shown in detail) of a simulation including the eight 
current RGGI states are not much different than those presented in Table 
2.  The equilibrium permit price rises from $69.13/tC to $69.53/tC 
 36. The EU cap is approximately equal to its Kyoto commitment of an 8 percent 
reduction below 1990 levels.  We did not have data for the current definition of the EU, 
so we were forced to use the definition of OECD Europe in its place.  This approximation 
led to using a cap for the EU in our simulations of 7.8 percent, rather than 8 percent, 
below 1990 levels. 
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because the defectors, MA and RI, have marginal cost curves below the 
coalition average.  The higher permit prices engender marginally fewer 
trades.  Both MA and RI were permit sellers, and NY, CT, and now VT, 
take up the slack, though all permit purchasing states buy fewer permits.  
Changes in net costs for all states are very small, with the largest 
absolute decrease being $50 million for NY. 
 The results of the modified coalition, but with the inclusion of PA, 
are shown in Table 4, and are compared with Table 3.  Here the permit 
price increases from $84.77/tC to $87.45/tC.  PA is still the largest 
permit buyer, though its purchases increase from $3,308 to $3,266. NY is 
still the largest permit seller, and again its sales increase as it takes up 
much of the slack from the defectors.  Net costs go up for PA and other 
permit buyers, and go down for all permit sellers relative to Table 3 
because of the increased permit price.  The maximum absolute value 
change in mitigation costs is less than two percent (PA).  Thus, the 
defection of MA and RI appears to make little difference, because MA’s 
marginal mitigation cost curve is near the middle of the RGGI pack and 
because RI is such a small participant. 
 
VI. Other Potential Coalitions 
 
 In this section, we explore PA’s participation in three other 
coalitions.  The first is with the North Central States of WV, IL, IN, MI, 
OH, WI, and WV.  The assumed advantage for PA is that these states are 
more similar to the State in terms of economic structure, including 
energy extraction and fossil fuel electricity generation, and have more 
consonant marginal costs of mitigation.  In fact, the results (not shown in 
detail for the lack of space) indicate that PA would become a net permit 
seller, since the State’s marginal cost curve is slightly below this 
coalition’s weighted average.  This is evidenced by the slight drop in the 
permit price from $156.97/tC before PA joins to $156.13/tC afterward.  
The irony, however, is that even though it becomes a permit seller, 
though of only 1.64 million tons (total revenue of $256 million), PA is 
still not as well off as if it joined RGGI!  The reason is that it loses the 
opportunity to buy relatively much cheaper permits ($69.13/tC) and must 
move up its steep marginal cost curve to sell permits.  In fact, the gains 
in terms of net costs from joining the North Central coalition are only 
estimated to be $3 million per year, in contrast to net cost reductions of 
$1,301 from joining the original RGGI coalition and $1,193 per year 
from joining the modified one.  Summary results for this coalition and 
the two following are presented in Table 5. 
 Another possible coalition option is that of Pennsylvania joining 
eleven Western States (AZ, CA, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, 
and WY) in a GHG cap and trade system.  As noted earlier, momentum 
is growing for a regional trading program in the west, and physical 
proximity is not a prerequisite for a GHG market, especially for 
“globally-mixed” pollutants like GHGs.  Again, here the expectation is 
that PA might be better off because of low cost abatement options and 
lower price permits in the west.  If we consider all eleven Western States, 
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however, the weighted average of the marginally cost curves are below 
that of PA, but not below that of the original or modified RGGI 
coalitions.  This is indicated by an equilibrium permit price of $89.06/tC 
for a Western States coalition without Pennsylvania and $99.87/tC if 
Pennsylvania joins.  For the latter case, PA would buy $2,986 million of 
permits annually and reduce its net cost by $780 million annually (still 
less than the $1,193 annual net cost gain of the modified RGGI system).  
PA would be the largest permit buyer in this arrangement, and California 
would be the largest seller.  The latter’s $5,867 million sales make up 
nearly 75 percent of the market, so there is some possibility of it 
exercising monopoly power among the other six permit selling states, 
which has more than 7 percent share of the market.  Of course, the gains 
to PA would increase if some of the high cost Western emitters (e.g., UT, 
WY) did not join the coalition. 
 The results of an analysis of a grand coalition of original RGGI plus 
MD, North Central, and Western States, plus PA, does not improve the 
situation over the RGGI and Western coalitions individually, though it is 
better than a North Central state coalition alone.  Again, this result 
emanates from the fact that equilibrium marginal mitigation costs 
(equivalent to the equilibrium permit price), as always, represent a 
weighted average of all states involved.  Here the permit price is 
$105.87/tC, and relative cost gains are only $61,12 million for PA. 
 
VII. Further Analysis of Results 
All of the simulations reveal the overall efficiency gains from 
trading with a system of flexible state-by-state quotas or caps.  These 
gains are, however, modest—less than 15 percent reduction in cost in all 
configurations, owing to the relatively narrow range of mitigation cost 
curves.  This is reminiscent of other intra-state trading experiences, such 
as the U.S. Sulfur Emissions Allowance Program,37 in sharp contrast to 
the much higher gains of a world-wide GHG permit trading system, 
which is projected to lower costs by more than 75 percent.38 
Still, despite the overall efficiency gains, several anomalies arise 
with respect to how individual states are affected within a given 
geographic configuration and with respect to increased flexibility, in our 
simulations, that of broadening the geographic coverage (“where” 
flexibility).  Some of these outcomes relate to idiosyncrasies of 
individual state characteristics (primarily mitigation cost curves and 
 37. A. DENNY ELLERMAN, ET. AL., MARKET FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN 
PROGRAM (2000). 
 38. ZhongXiang Zhang, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the World Trading 
Systems, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 219 (1998); Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens, An Economic 
Analysis of Flexible Permit Trading in the Kyoto Protocol, 1 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: 
POL., L. & ECON. 219 (2001).  Note that the estimates of the gains from trade in this paper 
are lower bounds on the potential, because they implicitly call for trading by state 
entities.  If trading is allowed by individual emitters, costs are not averaged within a state, 
and more gains can be obtained by taking advantage of greater differentials between high 
cost and low cost trading partners. 
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baselines), including the ability to wield market power.  Others stem 
from the nature of any market, permit or otherwise, especially with 
regard to the important role of relative prices.  A major manifestation of 
these features is some unusual distributions of gains from entering a 
GHG mitigation agreement, some of which may be considered to be 
inequities.39 
A summary of permit trading results affecting PA are presented in 
Table 5.  Some of the anomalies presented there, or as an implication of 
these results, stem from the fact that new entrants into a geographic 
configuration may raise the permit price, may undercut existing states’ 
permit sales, and may be able to exercise market power.  Some specific 
anomalies and surprises include: 
• The New England states’ net costs of achieving their GHG 
emission target are virtually the same if they were to proceed alone or 
if they join in the expanded RGGI system. 
• DE, MD, ME (all permit buyers) are worse off with the entry of 
Pennsylvania, because its entrance raises the equilibrium permit 
price. 
• PA would dominate an expanded RGGI market, with 91 percent of 
all permit purchases, at a trading volume of over $3.3 billion. 
• PA monopsony power makes little difference to its own net costs 
or to other RGGI participants. 
• EU involvement in an expanded RGGI system is likely to be small 
and may be nil if PA enters, because of the increase in the permit 
price stemming from PA’s relatively high mitigation cost. 
• PA is worse off joining a coalition of North Central States rather 
than joining RGGI, even though it becomes a permit seller, because 
the former coalition provides relatively fewer low cost mitigation 
options.  
• PA is also worse off joining a coalition of all twelve Western 
States rather than joining RGGI, though the situation could change if 
the former coalition did not include some states with relatively high 
GHG mitigation costs.  
 Overall, many of these anomalies can be explained by the relative 
position of any given state in relation to others in a coalition.  More gains 
are to be achieved for the group as a whole, the broader the distribution 
of mitigation cost curves (i.e., the more dissimilar the states and their 
 39. The problem is compounded by the lack of a consensus definition of the concept.  
See Adam Rose, et. al., International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming 
Policy, 12 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 25 (1998); Adam Rose & ZhongXiang Zhang, 
Interregional Burden-Sharing of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in the United States, 9 
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 477 (2004). 
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ability to mitigation and sequester GHGs).  States with relatively high 
costs are better off joining a coalition with low abatement cost states, 
even if it means having to be a permit buyer rather than a seller.  States 
with relatively low abatement cost curves are better off if they attract 
high cost states into their coalition.  Finally, not all states are better off 
by moving to national trading arrangement versus various regional ones, 
though, of course, the nation is better off as a whole in terms of 
addressing GHG mitigation at the lowest possible cost. 
 One implication of the strategy of picking the best permit trading 
partner is to consider looking beyond U.S. borders, especially to the west 
and south.  Developing countries are considered to have lower GHG 
mitigation costs than industrialized ones, due primarily to less efficient 
energy utilization of the former.  The Western States might consider 
including Mexico into their coalition, as well as other countries 
throughout the Pacific Rim.  Even Pennsylvania might consider this 
option or to become involved in the bi-lateral offset arrangement called 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which enables an 
industrialized country (or firm within it) to sponsor a GHG reducing 
action in a developing country and to receive emission reduction credits 
for it.  Finally, we note that the results here should be viewed as 
illustrative of a higher level of mitigation effort than actually agreed to 
by the RGGI states, as well as being preliminary because of the rough 
nature of mitigation cost and future emission estimates.  In terms of the 
latter, our estimates are likely to be at the upper range, thereby biasing 
costs and permit price results toward the high side.  The results across 
states, however, are less sensitive to these tenuous underlying 
considerations.  Moreover, indications are that they would not 
qualitatively change the results.  For example, a recent forecast of NY 
having lower emissions in 2010 than in 1990, and PA having 
significantly higher ones, simply reinforce NY’s likely role as the major 
permit seller and PA’s role as the major buyer.40  PA would have a larger 
gap between its baseline emissions and its cap, and NY would essentially 
be able to sell emissions already likely to occur without the agreement 
(an anomaly referred to as “hot air”). 
VI. Conclusions 
Several simulations have been presented of possible configurations 
of permit trading coalitions confronting Pennsylvania, with one of them 
even incorporating possible trading with the EU.  The results indicate the 
clear advantages of permit trading in general over a system of fixed 
emission caps.  Moreover, they indicate the overall gains from expanding 
 40. Note that we have not addressed the issue of carbon leakage within and across 
trading regions.  This refers to the shift of firms, as well as associated emissions, out of a 
geographic area because an environmental policy has increased the costs of doing 
business there, or to an increase in imports.  This is a major possibility in the Northeast, 
especially with respect to competitive electricity markets.  It is a major motivation for 
expanding the geographic coverage of the trading area. 
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the geographic coverage of the program.  At the same time, several 
anomalies are revealed for the permit market as a whole and for 
individual states.  It should be noted that only one of these anomalies, 
market power, detracts from the efficiency of the system.  Several of 
them, however, are likely to lead to a perception of inequity.  
Fortunately, several studies have shown that the distributional outcome 
of permit trading can be adjusted by modification of permit allocations, 
baselines, or caps, and without undercutting overall efficiency.41  At the 
same time, focusing on the equity issue makes the policy design all the 
more political.  A fair and open stakeholder process, however, can go a 
long way to resolving the ensuing tension. 
 Finally, we note that our focus on permit policy design has been on 
the geographic dimension, or “where” flexibility.  Discussions in RGGI 
included limited use of offsets to expand the system in other dimensions.  
These include:  “what” flexibility (emitters other than electric utilities 
and the inclusion of other GHGs), “when” flexibility (inclusion of 
borrowing and banking), and “how” flexibility (inclusion of options such 
as soil sequestration).  Our modeling approach is capable of identifying 
implications of these enhancements as well, in order to aid stakeholders 
and policymakers in their decisions.  
 41. See Adam Rose, et al., International Equity and Differentiation in Global 
Warming Policy, 12 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 25 (1998); Adam Rose & ZhongXiang 
Zhang, Interregional Burden-Sharing of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in the United States, 
9 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 477 (2004). 
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TABLE 1.  COST OF ACHIEVING 1990 CARBON EMISSIONS CAPS IN 
YEAR 2010:  NEW ENGLAND STATES ONLY (million $2004) 
 
 Before Trading After Trading 
State Mitigation Cost Mitigation Cost Trading Cost Net Cost 
     
CT 396 535 -150 385 
MA 968 972 -4 968 
ME 385 136 183 319 
NH 176 165 11 176 
RI 81 117 -40 77 
VT 62 62 -0 62 
      
Total 2,072 1,988 0 1,988 
Permit Price =  $68.02 per ton carbon (tC) 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.  COST OF ACHIEVING 1990 CARBON EMISSIONS CAPS IN 
YEAR 2010:  RGGI STATES (million $2004) 
 
 Before Trading After Trading 
State Mitigation Cost Mitigation Cost Trading Cost Net Cost 
     
CT 396 550 -169 381 
MA 968 1,001 -33 968 
ME 385 139 180 319 
NH 176 169 7 176 
RI 81 121 -44 77 
VT 62 62 -4 62 
      
NY 2,211 2,758 -579 2,178 
NJ 1,434 1,283 147 1,430 
DE 323 143 143 286 
MD 1,085 686 348 1,034 
      
Total 7,125 6,916 0 6,916 
Permit Price = $69.13/tC 
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TABLE 3.  COST OF ACHIEVING 1990 CARBON EMISSIONS CAPS IN 
YEAR 2010:  RGGI STATES PLUS PENNSYLVANIA (million $2004) 
 
 Before Trading After Trading 
State Mitigation Cost Mitigation Cost Trading Cost Net Cost 
     
CT 396 785 -466 319 
MA 968 1,434 -517 917 
ME 385 205 150 356 
NH 176 242 -70 172 
RI 81 172 -110 62 
VT 62 92 -33 59 
      
NY 2,211 3,935 -2,006 1,925 
NJ 1,434 1,848 -444 1,404 
DE 323 209 103 312 
MD 1,085 997 88 1,082 
     
PA 6,945 2,336 3,308 5,644 
      
Total 14,074 12,251 0 12,251 
Permit Price = $84.77/tC 
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TABLE 4.  COST OF ACHIEVING 1990 CARBON EMISSIONS CAPS IN 
YEAR 2010:  RGGI STATES MINUS MA & RI AND  
PLUS PA (million $2004) 
 
 Before Trading After Trading 
State Mitigation Cost Mitigation Cost Trading Cost Net Cost 
CT 396 829 -525 304 
ME 386 218 142 360 
NH 178 257 -88 169 
VT 62 97 -39 58 
     
NY 2,211 4,161 -2,305 1,856 
NJ 1,433 1,957 -570 1,387 
DE 324 221 93 312 
MD 1,085 1,057 27 1,085 
     
PA 6,945 2,486 3,266 5,752 
     
Total 13,021 11,283 0 11,283 
       Permit Price = $87.45/tC 
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TABLE 5.  SUMMARY OF PERMIT TRADING RESULTS 
 
 Permit Largest Largest Largest PA 
 Price Seller Buyer Gainera Gaina 
Case ($/tC) ($ million) ($ million) ($ million) (%) 
      
RGGI + PA 84.77 NY 2,006 PA 3,308 PA 1,301 PA 19 
      
RGGI + PA (MP) 82.09 NY 1,734 PA 2,673 PA 1,353 PA 19 
      
RGGI + EU + PA 87.43 NY 2,285 PA 3,271 PA 1,199 PA 17 
      
RGGI - MA/RI + PA 87.45 NY 2,305 PA 3,266 PA 1,193 PA 17 
      
N. Central + PA 156.13 IL 5,155 WV 4,331 WV 6,013 PA 0b 
      
Western + PA 99.87 CA 5,867 PA 2,986 WY 5,248 PA 11 
      
NC + W + PA 105.87 CA 7,144 IN 4,375 WV 7,496 PA 9 
      
aRefers to difference between Net Cost Before Trading and Net Cost After Trading. 
bLess than 0.5 percent. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.  BASIC DATA FOR RGGI STATES 
 
 
State 
Emissions 
in 1990 
(million tC) 
Emissions 
in 2010 
(million tC) 
Autarkic Marginal 
Mitigation Cost 
($2004 per tC) 
Gross State Product 
in 2000 
($2004 million) 
     
CT 
MA 
ME 
NH 
RI 
VT 
NY 
NJ 
DE 
MD 
PA 
 
 10.63 
 21.98 
 4.98 
 3.86 
 2.28 
 1.41 
 55.80 
 30.06 
 4.61 
 18.81 
 69.94 
 
14.60 
30.19 
6.82 
5.29 
3.13 
1.94 
76.65 
41.29 
6.34 
25.84 
96.07 
 
57.39 
67.89 
119.71 
71.04 
55.20 
67.96 
61.11 
73.52 
108.28 
88.89 
153.06 
 
175,268 
306,390 
39,264 
51,288 
39,059 
19,617 
864,149 
386,898 
40,315 
200,292 
432,396 
 
     
 
